Penn State Great Valley Management Research Showcase | Highlighting Research Projects of Penn State Faculty

Deferred Compensation and Firm Performance

Wednesday, April 10, Noon to 1 p.m., Main Building, Room 230

Free and open to faculty, staff, students, and the community. Seating is limited; register at ljh29@psu.edu or call 610-648-3229.

Presenter: Bo Ouyang, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Accounting
 
Unlike stock-based compensations, such as stock options, pensions and deferred compensations offer managers unfunded and unsecured fixed claims against the firms. During liquidation or bankruptcy, managers with deferred compensations do not get any preferential treatment of seniority and stand in line with other debt holders, plus their deferred compensations may be in jeopardy. Thus deferred compensations can adjust managerial risk preference. This presentation will explore the effect of the managerial deferred compensations on firm performance, i.e, whether firms granting more deferred compensations will perform better. The mechanisms through which deferred compensations influence firm performance will also be explored.

Dr. Ouyang teaches courses in financial accounting and financial statement analysis. His research interests include corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. He research is published in several peer-reviewed journals.